The library · Edition and sources
Philo: Questions and Answers on Genesis, I
C. D. Yonge (1854–1855) · Translated text
Opening (part 5)
place it is clear, that the first man who was formed out of the earth was made up both of earth and heaven; but because he did not continue uncorrupt, but despised the commandment of God, fleeing from the most excellent part, namely, from heaven, he gave himself up wholly as a slave to the earth, the denser and heavier element. In the second place, if any one burns with a desire of virtue, which makes the soul immortal, he, beyond all question, attains to a heavenly inheritance; but because he was covetous of pleasure, by which spiritual death is engendered, he again gives himself over a second time to the earth, on which account it is said to him, "Dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return;" therefore the earth, as it is the beginning of a wicked and depraved man, so also it is his end; but heaven is the beginning and end of him who is endowed with virtue.
(52) Why Adam called his wife Life, and affirmed to her, "Thou art the mother of all living?" (#Ge 3:20). In the first place, Adam gave to the first created woman that familiar name of Life, inasmuch as she was destined to be the fountain of all the generations which should ever arise upon the earth after their time. In the second place, he called her by this name because she did not derive the existence of her substance out of the earth, but out of a living creature, namely, out of one part of the man, that is to say, out of his rib, which was formed into a woman, and on that account she was called "life," because she was first made out of a living creature, and because the first beings who were endowed with reason were to be generated from her. Nevertheless, it is possible that this may have been a metaphorical expression; for is not the outward sense, which is a figurative emblem of the woman, called with peculiar propriety "life?" because it is by the possession of these senses that the living being is above all other means distinguished from that which is not alive, as it is by that that the imaginations and impulses of the soul are set in motion, for the senses are the causes of each; and, in real truth the outward sense is the mother of all living creatures, for as there could be no generation without a mother, so also there could be no living creature without sense.
(53) Why God made garments of skins for Adam and his wife, and clothed them? (#Ge 3:21). Perhaps some one may laugh at the expressions here used, considering the small value of the garments thus made, as if they were not at all worthy of the labour of a Creator of such dignity and greatness; but a man who has a proper appreciation of wisdom and virtue will rightly and deservedly look upon this work as one very suitable for a God, that, namely, of teaching wisdom to those who were before labouring to no purpose; and who, having but little anxiety about procuring useful things, being seized with an insane desire for miserable honours, have given themselves up as slaves to convenience, looking upon the study of wisdom and virtue with detestation, and being in love with splendour of life and skill in mean and handicraft arts, which is in no way connected with a virtuous man. And these unhappy men do not know that a frugality, which is in need of nothing, becomes, as it were, a relation and neighbour to man, but that luxurious splendour is banished to a distance as an enemy; therefore the garment made of skins, if one should come to a correct judgment, deserves to be looked upon as a more noble possession than a purple robe embroidered with various colours. Therefore this is the literal meaning of the text; but if we look to the real meaning, then the garment of skins is a figurative expression for the natural skin, that is to say, our body; for God, when first of all he made the intellect, called it Adam; after that he created the outward sense, to which he gave the name of Life. In the third place, he of necessity also made a body, calling that by a figurative expression, a garment of skins; for it was fitting that the intellect and the outward sense should be clothed in a body as in a garment of skins; that the creature itself might first of all appear worthy of divine virtue; since by what power can the formation of the human body be put together more excellently, and in a more becoming manner, than by God? on which account he did put it together, and at the same time he clothed it; when some prepare articles of human clothing and others put them on; but this natural clothing, contemporary with the man himself, namely, the body, belonged to the same Being both to make and to clothe the man in after it was made.
(54) Who those beings are to whom God says, "Behold, Adam has become as one of us, to know good and evil?" (#Ge 3:22). The expression, "one of us," indicates a plurality of beings; unless indeed we are to suppose, that God is conversing with his own virtues, which he employed as instruments, as it were, to create the universe and all that is in it; but that expression "as," resembles an enigma, and a similitude, and a comparison, but is not declaratory of any dissimilarity; for that which is intelligible and sensibly good, and likewise that which is of a contrary character, is known to God in a different manner from that in which it is known to man; since, in the same way in which the natures of those who inquire and those who comprehend, and the things themselves too which are inquired into, and perceived, and comprehended, are distinguished, virtue itself is also capable of comprehending them. But all these things are similitudes, and forms, and images, among men; but among the gods they are prototypes, models, indications, and more manifest examples of things which are somewhat obscure; but the unborn and uncreated Father joins himself to no one, except with the intention of extending the honour of his virtues.
(55) What is the meaning of the words, "Lest perchance he put forth his hand and take of the tree of life, and eat and live for ever;" for there is no uncertainty and no envy in God? (#Ge 3:23). It is quite true that God never feels either uncertainty or envy; nevertheless he often employs ambiguous things and expressions, assenting to them as a man might do; for, as I have said before, the supreme providence is of a twofold nature, sometimes being God, and not acting in any respect as a man; but, on some occasions, as a man instructs his son, so likewise should the Lord God give warning to you. Therefore the first of these circumstances belongs to his sovereign power, and the second to his disciplinary, and to the first introduction to instruction, so as to insinuate into man's heart a voluntary inclination, since that expression, "lest perchance," is not to be taken as a proof of any hesitation on the part of God, but in relation to man, who, by his nature, is prone to hesitation, and is a denunciation of the inclinations which exist in him. For when any appearance of anything whatever occurs to any man, immediately there arises within him an impulse towards that which appears, being caused by that very thing which appears. And from this arises the second hesitating kind of uncertainty, distracting the mind in various directions, as to whether the thing is fit to be accepted, or acquired, or not. And very likely present circumstances have a respect to that second feeling; for, in truth, the Divinity is incapable of any cunning, or malevolence, or wickedness: it is absolutely impossible that God should either envy the immortality or any other good fortune belonging to any being. And we can bring the most undeniable proof of this; for it was not in consequence of any one's entreaties that he created the world; but, being a merciful benefactor, rendering an essence previously untamed and unregulated, and liable to suffering, gentle and pleasant, he did so by a vast harmony of blessings, and a regulated arrangement of them, like a chorus; and he being himself the only sure being, planted the tree of life by his own luminous character. Moreover, he was not influenced by the mediation or exhortation of any other being in communicating incorruptibility to man. But while man existed as the purest intellect, displaying no appearance either of work or of any evil discourse, he was certain to have a fitting guide, to lead him in the paths of piety, which is undoubted and genuine immortality. But from the time when he began to be converted to depravity, wishing for the things which belong to mortal life, he wandered from immortality; for it is not fitting that craft and wickedness should be rendered immortal, and moreover it would be useless to the subject; since the longer the life is which is granted to the wicked and depraved man, the more miserable is he than others, so that his immortality becomes a grave misfortune to him.
(56) Why now he calls the Paradise "pleasure," when he is sending man forth out of it to till the ground from which he was taken. (#Ge 3:23). The distinction of agriculture is conspicuous, when man in the state of paradise, practising the cultivation of wisdom as if he were employed in the cultivation of trees, and enjoying the food of imperishable and most useful fruits, was himself endowed with immortality likewise. After that, being expelled from the place of wisdom, he experienced the opposite effects of ignorance, by which the body is polluted, and at the same time the intellect is blinded, and, being exposed to a want of proper food, he wastes away, and yields to a miserable death. On which account, now, in contempt of the foolish man, God calls the Paradise "pleasure," in order to put it in opposition to a life of pain, and misery, and savageness. In truth, the life which is passed in wisdom is a pleasure, full of liberal joy, and is the constant enjoyment of a rational soul; but that life which is destitute of wisdom is found to be both savage and miserable, although it is excessively deceived by the appetites, which pain both precedes and follows.
(57) Why God places a cherubim in front of the Paradise, and a flaming sword, which turned every way, to keep the way of the tree of life? (#Ge 3:24). The name cherubim designates the two original virtues which belong to the Deity, namely, his creative and his royal virtues. The one of which has the title of God, the other, or the royal virtue, that of Lord. Now the form of the creative power is a peaceable, and gentle, and beneficent virtue; but the royal power is a legislative, and chastising, and correcting virtue. Moreover, by the flaming sword he here symbolically intimates the heaven: for the air is of a flaming colour, and turns itself round, revolving about the universe. Therefore, all these things assumed to themselves the guardianship of the Paradise, because they are the presidents over wisdom, like a mirror; since, to illustrate my meaning by an example, the wisdom of the world is a sort of mirror of the divine virtues, in the similitude of which it was perfected, and by which the universe and all the things in it are regulated and arranged. But the way to wisdom is called philosophy (a word which means the love or the pursuit of wisdom). And since the creative virtue is endued with philosophy, being both philosophical and royal, so also the world itself is philosophical. Some persons however have fancied that it is the sun which is indicated by the flaming sword; because, by its constant revolutions and turnings every way, it marks out the seasons of the year, as being the guardian of human life and of every thing which serves to the life of all men.
(58) Whether it was properly said with respect to Cain: "I have gotten a man from the Lord?" (#Ge 4:1). Here there is a distinction made, as to-from some one, and out of some one, and by some thing. Out of some one, as out of materials; from some one, as from a cause; and by some thing, as by an instrument. But the Father and Creator of all the world is not an instrument, but a cause. Therefore he wanders from right wisdom who says, "That what has been made has been made, not from God, but by God."
(59) Why the sacred historian first describes the employment of the younger brother, Abel, saying: "He was a keeper of sheep; but Cain was a cultivator of the earth?" (#Ge 4:2). Since, although the virtuous son was in point of time younger than the wicked son, yet in point of virtue he was older. On which account, on the present occasion, when their actions are to be compared together, he is placed first. Therefore one of them exercises a business, and takes care of living creatures, although they are devoid of reason, gladly taking upon himself the employment of a shepherd, which is a princely office, and as it were a sort of rehearsal of royal power; but the other devotes his attention to earthly and inanimate objects.
(60) Why Cain after some days offers up the first-fruits of his fruits, but when it is said that "Abel offered up first-fruits of the first-born of his flock and of the fat," "after some days" is not added? (#Ge 4:3û4). Moses here intimates the difference between a lover of himself, and one who is thoroughly devoted to God; for the one took to himself the first-fruits of his fruits, and very impiously looked upon God as worthy only of the secondary and inferior offerings; for the expression, "after some days," implies that he did not do so immediately; and when it is said that he offered of the fruits, that intimates that he did not offer of the best fruits which he had, and herein displays his iniquity. But the other, without any delay, offered up the first-born and eldest of all his flocks, in order that in this the Father might not be treated unworthily.
(61) Why, when he had begun with Cain, he still mentions him here in the second place, when he says: "And God had respect unto Abel and unto his offerings; but unto Cain and unto his sacrifices he paid no attention?" (#Ge 4:5). In the first place, because the good man, who is by nature first, is not at