Philo: Questions and Answers on Genesis, I

and Gihon being the sign of sobriety, as having its employment in the regulation of meat and drink, and as restraining the appetites of the belly, and of those parts which are blow the belly, as being earthly; the Tigris again is the sign of fortitude, for this it is which regulates the raging commotion of anger within us; and the Euphrates is the sign of justice, since there is nothing in which the thoughts of men exult more than in justice.

(13) Why it is that he not only describes the situation of the Euphrates, but also says that the Phison goes round all the land of Evilat, and that the Gihon goes round all the land of Ethiopia, and that the Tigris goes toward Assyria? (#Ge 2:14). The Tigris is a very cruel and mischievous river, as the citizens of Babylon bear witness, and so do the magi, who have found it to be of a character quite different from the nature of other rivers; however they might also have another reason for looking on it with aversion. But the Euphrates is a gentler, and more salubrious, and more nourishing stream. On which account, the wise men of the Hebrews and Assyrians speak of it as one which increases and extends itself; and on this account it is not here characterised by its connection with other things, as the other three rivers are, but by itself. My own opinion is, that these expressions are all symbolical, for prudence is the virtue of the rational part of man; and it is in this that wickedness is sometimes found. And fortitude is that portion of the human character which is liable to degenerate into anger. And sobriety, again, may be impaired by the desires, but anger and concupiscence are the characteristics of beasts; therefore the sacred historian has here described those three rivers by the places which they flow round. But he has not described the Euphrates in that manner, as being the symbol of justice, for there is no certain and limited portion of it allotted to the soul, but a perfect harmony of the three parts of the soul and of the three virtues is possessed by it.

(14) Why God placed man in the Paradise with a twofold object, namely, that he might both till it and keep it, when the Paradise was in reality in need of no cultivation, because it was perfect in everything, as having been planted by God; nor, again, did it require a keeper, for who was there to ravage it? (#Ge 2:15). These are the two objects which a cultivation of the land must attain to and take care of, the cultivation of the land and the safe keeping of the things which are in it, otherwise it will be spoiled by laziness or else by devastation. But although the Paradise did not stand in need of these exertions, nevertheless it was proper that he who had the regulation and care of it committed to him, namely, the first man, should be as it were a sort of pattern and law to all workmen in future of everything which ought to be done by them. Moreover it was suitable that, though all the Paradise was full of everything, it should still leave the cultivator some grounds for care, and some means of displaying his industry; for instance, by digging around it, and tending it, and softening it, and digging trenches, and irrigating it by water; and it was needful to attend to its safety, although there was no one to lay it waste, because of the wild beasts, also more especially in respect of the air and water; as, for instance, when a drought prevailed, to irrigate it with a plenteous supply of water, and in moister weather to check the superabundance of moisture by directing the course of the streams in other directions.

(15) Why, when God commanded the man to eat of every tree within the Paradise, he speaks in the singular number, and says, "Thou shalt eat;" but when he commands that he shall abstain from the tree which would give him the knowledge of good and evil, he speaks in the plural number, and says, "Ye shall not eat of it, for in the day in which ye eat of it ye shall surely die?" (#Ge 2:16). In the first place he uses this language because one good was derived from many; and that also is not unimportant in these principles, since he who has done anything which is of utility is one, and he who attains to anything useful is also one; but when I say one, I am speaking not of that which in point of number comes before duality, but of that one creative virtue by which many beings rightly coalesce, and by their concord imitate singularity, as a flock, a herd, a troop, a chorus, an army, a nation, a tribe, a family, a state; for all these things being many members form one community, being united by affection as by a kiss; when things which are not combined, and which have no principle of union by reason of their duality and multitude, fall into different divisions, for duality is the beginning of discord. But two men living as if they were one, by the same philosophy, practise an unalloyed and brilliant virtue, which is free from all taint of wickedness; but where good and evil are mingled together the combination contains the principle of death.

(16) What is the meaning of the expression, "Ye shall surely die?" (#Ge 2:17). The death of the good is the beginning of another life; for life is a twofold thing, one life being in the body, corruptible; the other without the body, incorruptible. Therefore one wicked man surely dies the death, who while still breathing and among the living is in reality long since buried, so as to retain in himself no single spark of real life, which is perfect virtue. But a good man, who deserves so high a title, does not surely die, but has his life prolonged, and so attains to an eternal end.

(17) Why God says, "It is not good for man to be alone; let us make him a help meet for him?" (#Ge 2:18). By these words God intimates that there is to be a communion, not with all men, but with those who are willing to be assisted and in their turn to assist others, even though they may scarcely have any power to do so; since love consists not more in utility than in the harmonious concord of trustworthy and steadfast manners; so that every one who joins in a communion of love may be entitled to utter the expression of Pythagoras, "A friend is another I."

(18) Why, when God had already said, "Let us make a help for man," he creates beasts and cattle? (#Ge 2:19). Perhaps some gluttons and insatiably greedy persons may say that God did this because beasts and flying things were, as it were, necessary food for man, and his meetest helper; for that the eating of meat assists the belly so as to conduce to the health and vigour of the body. But I should think that by reason of the evil implanted in them by nature animals of all kinds, whether terrestrial or flying in the air, were in this age hostile to and contrary to man; but that in the case of the first man, as one adorned with every imaginable virtue, they were, as it were, allies, and a reinforcement in war, and familiar friends, as being tame and domestic by nature, and this was the sole principle of their familiarity with man, for this it was fit that servants should dwell with their lord.

(19) Why the creation of animals and flying creatures is mentioned a second time, when the account of their creation had already been given in the history of the six days? (#Ge 2:19). Perhaps those things which were created in the six days were incorporeal angels, indicated under these symbolical expressions, being the appearances of terrestrial and flying animals, but now they were produced in reality, being the copies of what had been created before, images perceptible by the outward senses of invisible models.

(20) Why did God bring every animal to man, that he might give them their names? (#Ge 2:19). He has here explained a great source of perplexity to the students of philosophy, admonishing them that names proceed from having been given, and not from nature; for a natural nomenclature is with peculiar fitness assigned to each creature when a man of wisdom and pre-eminent knowledge appears; and, in fact, the office of assigning the names to animals is one which particularly belongs to the mind of the wise man alone, and indeed to the first man born out of the earth, since it was fitting that the first of the human race, and the sovereign of all the animals born out of the earth, should have the dignity assigned to him. For inasmuch as he was the first person to see the animals, and as he was the first person who deserved to govern them all as their chief, so also it was fitting that he should be their first namer and the inventor of their names, since it would have been inconsistent and mad to leave them without any names, or to allow them to receive names from any one born at a later period, which would have been an insult to and a derogation from the honour and glory due to the first born. But we may also adopt this idea, that the giving of names to the different animals was so easily arranged that the very moment that Adam gave the name the animal itself also heard it; being influenced by the name thus given to it as by a familiar indication closely connected with it.

(21) Why does Moses say, "He brought the animals to Adam, that he might see what he would call them," when God can never entertain a doubt? (#Ge 2:19). It is in truth inconsistent with the nature of God to doubt; therefore it does not appear that he was in doubt on this occasion, but that since he had given intellect to man as being the first man born out of the earth and endowed with a great desire for virtue, by which he was made thoroughly wise as if he had been endowed with wisdom by nature, so as to consider all things like the proper Ruler and Lord of all, God now caused him to be influenced to display the proper performance of his task, and saw what was really the most excellent point of his mind. Besides this, by this statement he evidently indicates the perfect free-will existing in us, refuting those who affirm that everything exists by a certain necessity. Or else because it belonged to man to employ the animals, therefore he also gave him authority to give them names.

(22) What is the meaning of the expression, "And whatever he called each living thing, that was the name thereof?" (#Ge 2:19). We must consider that Adam gave names not only to all living creatures, but also to plants, and to everything else which is inanimate, beginning with the more excellent class; for the living creature is superior to that which has not life. Therefore the scripture considers the mention of the better part sufficient, indicating by this mention to all who are not utterly devoid of sense, that he in fact gave names to everything, since it was easy to fix names to things without life, which were never likely to change their place, and which had no passions of the soul to exercise, but the giving of proper appellations to living creatures was a more difficult task on account of the motions of their bodies and the various impulses of their souls, in accordance with the imagination and the variety of the outward senses, and the different agitations of the mind from which the effects of their works proceed. Therefore the mind could give names to the more difficult classes of living creatures. And on this account it was a very proper expression to employ, that he gave them names as being easy to name, because they were near.

(23) What is the meaning of the expression: "But for Adam there was not found a helper like to him?" (#Ge 2:20). Every thing was helping and assisting the prince of the human race: the earth, the rivers, the sea, the air, the light, the heaven. Moreover, every species of fruit and plant co-operated with him, and every herd of cattle, and every beast which was not savage. Nevertheless, of all these things which were assisting him, there was nothing like himself, inasmuch as they were none of them human beings. Therefore, God gave a certain indication that he might show that man ought to be an assistant to and co-operator with man, being endowed with perfect similarity to one another in both body and soul.

(24) What is the meaning of the statement, "And God sent a trance upon Adam, and caused him to sleep?" (#Ge 2:21). How it is that man sleeps is a question which has caused an extraordinary amount of perplexity to philosophers. But yet our prophet has distinctly explained this question; for sleep is in itself properly a trance, not of that kind which is more nearly allied to insanity, but of that which is in accordance with the dissolution of the senses and the absence of counsel; for then the senses withdraw from those things which are their proper object, and the intellect withdraws from the senses, not strengthening their nerves, nor giving any motion to those parts which have received the power of action, inasmuch as they are withdrawn from the objects perceptible by the outward senses.

(25) What the rib is which God took from the man whom he had formed out of the earth, and which he made into a woman? (#Ge 2:21û22). The letter of this statement is plain enough; for it is expressed according to a symbol of the part, a half of the whole, each party, the man and the woman, being as sections of nature co-equal for the production of that genus which is called man. But with respect to the mind, man is understood in a symbolical manner, and his one rib is virtue, proceeding from the senses; but woman, who is the sensation of counsel, will be more variable. But some think that the rib means valour and vigour, on which account men call a boxer who as strong loins eminently strong. Therefore, the lawgiver relates that the woman was formed out of the rib of the man, indicating by that expression, that one half of the body of the man is woman. And this is testified to by the formation of the body, by the way in which it is put together, by its motions and vigour, by the force of the soul, and its strength; for all things are regarded as in a twofold light; since, as the