Philo: On the Virtues

XLI. (226) We must not, therefore, give in to those persons who seek to creep stealthily into the possession of a property belonging to others, namely, nobility of birth, as though it were of right their own, and who, with the exception of those whom I have mentioned, might justly be looked upon as enemies not only of the race of the Jews but of all the human race in every quarter. Of the one because they give a truce to those of the same nation, allowing them to despise sound and stable virtue, through trusting implicitly in the virtue of their ancestors; and of the others because, even if they could attain to the highest and most absolute perfection of all excellence, they would still derive no advantage themselves, because of their not having irreproachable fathers and grandfathers.

(227) Than which I do not know that there can possibly be a more mischievous doctrine, if there is no avenging punishment to follow those who being descended of virtuous parents have made themselves, and if on the contrary no honour is to be assigned to those who have become good though born of wicked parents, though the law judges each man by himself, and does not praise or blame any one with reference to the virtues or vices of his ancestors.